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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the security of the NOEKEON
block cipher against side channel cube attacks. NOEKEON was proposed
by Daemen et al. for the NESSIE project. The block size and the key size
are both 128 bits. The cube attack, introduced by Dinur and Shamir at
EUROCRYPT 2009, is a new type of algebraic cryptanalysis. The attack
may be applied if the adversary has access to a single bit of information
that can be represented by a low degree multivariate polynomial over
GF(2) of secret and public variables. In the side channel attack model,
the attacker is assumed to have access to some leaked information about
the internal state of the cipher as well as the plaintext and ciphertext.
Adopting the notion of a single bit leakage as formalized by Dinur and
Shamir, we assume that the attacker has only one bit of information
about the intermediate state after each round. Using this side channel
attack model, we show that it is possible to extract 60 independent linear
equations over 99 (out of 128) key variables. To recover the whole 128-bit
key, the attack requires only about 210 chosen plaintext and O(268) time
complexity.
Keywords: Algebraic cryptanalysis, block ciphers, cube attacks,
NOEKEON, side channel attacks.
1 Introduction
Almost any cryptosystem can be represented by a system of multivariate poly-
nomial equations over a ﬁnite ﬁeld, e.g. GF(2). The cube attack, formalized by
Dinur and Shamir at EUROCRYPT 2009 [9], is a generic type of algebraic at-
tacks. The attack aims to derive low-degree equations that can be exploited for
constructing distinguishers, e.g. [2], and/or key recovery attacks, e.g. [9, 2]. An
interesting feature of the cube attack is that it only requires a black-box access
to a target cryptosystem and may be applied even if only a few output bits can
be accessed by an adversary.
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For a properly designed (“good”) cipher, whose algebraic representation over
GF(2) is of degree d (i.e. the maximum degree of the output bits represented
as boolean functions is d), the cube attack will require about 2d computations.
Therefore, in general, the attack’s success depends on whether this computa-
tional complexity is feasible or not; however we note that this “generic complex-
ity” does not imply that the attack may not be successful for speciﬁc cases. The
cube attack has been successfully applied (for key recovery) against a reduced-
round variant of the Trivium [6] stream cipher in [9] and (as a distinguisher)
against a reduced-round variant of the MD6 hash function [14] in [2].
In trying to apply cube attacks to block ciphers, the main problem is that the
degree of the polynomial representing a ciphertext bit grows exponentially with
the number of rounds in the cipher. Hence, the cube attack usually becomes
ineﬀective after a few rounds if one considers only the standard attack model
that is used in the well-known statistical attacks such as the Diﬀerential and
Linear attacks. Nevertheless, considering the practical implementations of the
block cipher, especially in resource limited systems such as smart cards, there is
a stronger attack model, namely the side channel attack model, where the adver-
sary is given more power by having access to some “limited ” information leaked
about the internal state of the cipher. This information leakage can be via phys-
ical side channels, such as timing, electrical power consumption, electromagnetic
radiation, probing, etc.
Dinur and Shamir in [10] proposed a side channel attack model, where the
adversary is assumed to have access to “only one bit of information” about the
internal state of the block cipher after each round. This one bit of information can
be, for example, a single bit of the internal state itself or a bit of information
about the Hamming weight of the internal state. They showed that the cube
attack in this single-bit-leakage side channel model can recover the secret key of
the Serpent [1] and AES [7] block ciphers much easier than the previously known
side channel attacks. Recently, Yang et al. at CANS 2009 [15] investigated the
side channel cube attack on the PRESENT block cipher [5]. It is worth noticing
that the single-bit-leakage side channel cube attack against a block cipher is
diﬀerent from a cube attack against a reduced-round variant of the cipher; while
in the former the adversary has access to only one bit of information about the
internal state, in the latter the adversary has access to the whole internal state
after a reduced number of rounds.
In this paper, we investigate the security of the NOEKEON block cipher
[8] against the cube attack in the single-bit-leakage side channel attack model.
NOEKEON is designed to be eﬃcient and secure on a wide range of platforms
including the environment with limited resources such as smart cards. The de-
signers of NOEKEON have shown how the cipher can be adapted to provide an
anti-DPA variant of NOEKEON which is secure against diﬀerential power anal-
ysis (DPA) attacks. However, the implementation cost for the anti-DPA version
is almost twice that of a normal NOEKEON implementation. They also noticed
that to prevent higher-order DPA attacks one will have to use even less eﬃ-
cient variants. If the cipher were to be implemented in a time-critical system,
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it is likely that this kind of anti-DPA variants not to be implemented due to
the eﬃciency/security trade-oﬀ. Many papers on side channel attacks such as in
[12, 13] also concentrate on countermeasures which minimize the leakage from
the implementation.
We note that these kind of countermeasures against speciﬁc types of side chan-
nel attacks (e.g. timing attack or DPA) do not remove the possibility of all side
channel attacks such as electromagnetic radiations, probing, etc. In this paper
we do not consider these speciﬁc issues and countermeasures about the actual
physical aspects of the implementation attacks and how information leakage can
be measured. Rather, we assume the single-bit-leakage side channel model as an
abstract attack model, and concentrate on investigating the security of ciphers
against cube attacks in this attack model.
Our Contribution. We investigate the security of the NOEKEON block cipher
against cube attacks in the single-bit-leakage side channel attack model. First,
we show how to determine the appropriate round to ﬁnd most of the key bits.
Using a single bit of the internal state after the second round, we extract 60
independent linear equations over 99 key variables. To recover the whole 128-bit
key, the attack requires about 210 chosen plaintext and O(268) time complexity.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2 and 3, we review the cube attack and
the construction of NOEKEON block cipher, respectively. Section 4 contains the
main contribution of this paper, where we provide the details of the side channel
cube attack on NOEKEON. Section 5 concludes the paper and provides some
open problems for future research.
2 A Review on the Cube Attack
In algebraic attacks, one aims at recovering the secret key in cryptosystems by
manipulating and solving the underlying algebraic equations. Solving a system of
multivariate equations over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F, in general, is known to be an NP-hard
problem [11]. However, it has been demonstrated that ﬁnding solutions faster
than by the exhaustive search may be possible if the algebraic equations have
a relatively low algebraic degree when considered as multivariate polynomial
equations. An ideal situation is when one can derive enough number of indepen-
dent linear equations which are easily solvable (e.g. by Gaussian elimination);
the cube attack aims at doing this.
The main point of the cube attack is that, the multivariate “master” poly-
nomial p(v1, · · · , vm, k1, · · · , kn), representing an output bit of a cryptosystem
over GF(2) of secret variables ki (key bits) and public variables vi (i.e. plaintext
or initial values), may induce algebraic equations of lower degrees, in particular
linear equations. The cube attack provides a method to derive such lower degree
(especially linear) equations, given the master polynomial only as a black-box
which can be evaluated on the secret and public variables.
Let’s ignore the distinction between the secret and public variables’ notations
and denote all of them by xi, · · · , x, where  = m + n. Let I ⊆ {1, ..., } be a
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subset of the variable indexes, and tI denote a monomial term containing multi-
plication of all the xi’s with i ∈ I. By factoring the master polynomial p by the
monomial tI , we have:
p(x1, · · · , x) = tI · pS(I) + q(x1, · · · , x) (1)
where pS(I), which is called the superpoly of tI in p, does not have any common
variable with tI , and each monomial term tJ in the residue polynomial q misses
at least one variable from tI . A term tI is called a “maxterm” if its superpoly in
p is linear polynomial which is not a constant, i.e. deg(pS(I)) = 1.
The main observation of the cube attack is that, if we sum p over tI , i.e.
by assigning all the possible combinations of 0/1 values to the xi’s with i ∈ I
and ﬁxing the value of all the remaining xi’s with i /∈ I, the resultant polyno-
mial equals to pS(I) (mod 2). More formally, a subset I of size s (where s ≤ )
deﬁnes a boolean cube CI containing 2s boolean vectors which are formed by
assigning all 2s values to the xi’s with i ∈ I, and leaving all the remaining
variables (i.e. xi’s with i /∈ I) undetermined. For example, if I = {1, 2} then
CI = {(0, 0, x3, · · · , x), (0, 1, x3, · · · , x), (1, 0, x3, · · · , x), (1, 1, x3, · · · , x)}.
Any vector w ∈ CI deﬁnes a derived polynomial p|w with − s variables whose
degree may be the same or lower than the degree of the master polynomial p.
Summing the 2s derived polynomials over GF(2) deﬁned by the vectors in the
cube CI , we get a new polynomial pI deﬁned by pI 
∑
w∈CI p|w. The following
theorem states the main observation used by the cube attack.
Theorem 1 (The Main Observation [9]). Given a polynomial p over GF(2)
with  variables, and any index subset I ⊆ {1, · · · , }, we have pI = pS(I).
Given access to a cryptographic function with public and secret variables, this
observation enables an attacker to recover the value of the secret variables (ki’s)
in two steps, namely preprocessing and online phase, which are described in the
sequel.
Preprocessing Phase. During the preprocessing phase, the attacker ﬁrst ﬁnds
suﬃciently many maxterms, i.e. tI ’s, such that each tI consists of a subset of
public variables v1, · · · , vm. To ﬁnd the maxterms, the attacker performs a prob-
abilistic linearity test on pS(I) over the secret variables ki ∈ {k1, · · · , kn} while
the value of the public variables not in tI are ﬁxed (to 0 or 1). For example, the
BLR test of [4] can be used for this purpose. This test requires the attacker to
choose a suﬃcient number of vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1}n independently and uniformly
at random representing samples of n-bit key, and then for each pair of vectors x
and y, the attacker sums the polynomial p over tI to verify whether or not each
one of them satisﬁes the relation:
pS(I)[0] + pS(I)[x] + pS(I)[y] = pS(I)[x+ y] (2)
If all the vectors x and y satisfy the relation, with high probability pS(I) is
linear over the secret variables; that is, tI is a maxterm. Then the next step is to
derive linearly independent equations in the secret variables ki’s from pS(I) that
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are closely related to the master polynomial p, such that, solving them enables
the attacker to determine the values of the secret variables.
Online Phase. Once suﬃciently many linearly independent equations in the
secret variables are found, the preprocessing phase is completed. In the online
phase, the attacker’s aim is to ﬁnd the value of the right-hand side of each
linear equation by summing the black box polynomial p over the same set of
maxterms tI ’s which are obtained during the preprocessing phase. Now, the
attacker can easily solve the resultant system of the linear equations, e.g. by
using the Gaussian elimination method, to determine the values of the secret
(key) variables.
3 A Brief Description of the NOEKEON Block Cipher
NOEKEON [8] is a block cipher with a block and key length of 128 bits. It
produces a ciphertext after iterating a round function 16 times, followed by
a ﬁnal output function. The speciﬁcation of NOEKEON [8], provides a key
schedule which converts the 128-bit “Cipher Key” (i.e. the original key) into
a 128-bit “Working Key”, which is used in the round function. However, the
use of the key schedule is optional. If related-key attack scenarios [3] are not
of a concern, then the key schedule is not applied (i.e. the Cipher Key is used
directly as the Working Key), and the cipher is called to be used in the “direct-
key mode”. Otherwise, it operates in the “indirect-key mode”, where the Cipher
Key is processed by the key schedule algorithm to produce the Working Key.
A graphical representation of the round function of NOEKEON is shown in
Fig. 1. It consists of two linear functions, Θ and Π (as illustrated in the ﬁgure),
and a nonlinear function Γ which is described shortly. We describe the encryp-
tion mode of the cipher. The description of the cipher in the decryption (i.e.
inverse) mode is also quite straightforward, where the inverse of the component
functions are used (we refer to [8] for a complete description of the cipher). The
constants C1 and C2 are two round constants. C2 is set to zero during the encryp-
tion process and C1 is set to zero during the decryption process. The constant
C1 that is used during the encryption process can be computed in recursive way
as follows:
C01 = 0x80;
if (Cr1 & 0x80 != 0) then C
r+1
1 = C
r
1  1 ^ 0x1B
else Cr+11 = C
r
1  1;
Let Ar = A0rA
1
rA
2
rA
3
r denote the 128-bit internal state after round r; where A
i
r’s
are 32-bit words, and A0 contains the input plaintext P to the cipher. Then
NOEKEON encryption algorithm can be described as follows:
For r = 0; r < 16; r++
Ar+1 = Π−1(Γ (Π(Θ(Ar ,K))));
A17 = Θ(A16,K)
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where A17 denotes the 128-bit output ciphertext, and K = K0K1K2K3 is the
128-bit working key (Ki’s are 32-bit words).
The nonlinear transformation Γ operates on 32 4-tuples of bits (4-bit boxes)
using a S-box which is shown in Table 1 (4-bit values are represented by a
hexadecimal number). The 4-bit boxes which are input to the S-Boxes, at the
round r, are formed by selecting four bits from the words A0r , A
1
r, A
2
r , A
3
r, that
are in the same position. For example, box 1 consists of the ﬁrst bit from each
word, box 2 contains the second bit from each word, and so on.
Table 1. Speciﬁcation of the S-box in the function Γ
Input: x3x2x1x0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
Output: y3y2y1y0 7 A 2 C 4 8 F 0 5 9 1 E 3 D B 6
A0r A
1
r A
2
r A
3
r
A0r+1 A
1
r+1 A
2
r+1 A
3
r+1
Cr1
K0
K1
K2
K3
Cr2
Γ
Θ
Π
Π−1
8
8
1 5 2
8
8
1 5 2
Fig. 1. The round function of NOEKEON
4 The Side Channel Cube Attack on NOEKEON
4.1 Finding the Eﬃcient Round for Side Channel Attacks
In order to apply the single-bit-leakage side channel cube attack on the
NOEKEON block cipher, we need to ﬁnd out the round in which the cipher be-
gins achieving complete diﬀusion. This enables us to ﬁnd most of the key variables
from low degree master polynomials in early rounds of the encryption process.
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To do this, we determine the number of key variables that can be found within
the master polynomials representing each bit of the internal state after each
round; i.e. the master polynomials representing Ajr[i] for 1 ≤ r ≤ 16, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3,
and 0 ≤ i ≤ 31.
The following lemma is a corollary of the main observations supporting the
cube attack as described in Sec. 2.
Lemma 1. Let p be a given (black-box) master polynomial over GF(2) in 
variables x1, · · · , x; I ⊆ {1, · · · , }; s = |I|, and tI denote the multiplication
of xi’s with i ∈ I. Let pI 
∑
w∈CI p|w be the derived polynomial obtained by
summing p over the cube CI (see Sec. 2). tI appears in p, either as a monomial
or as a common subterm of some monomials, if and only if there exist at least
a vector x ∈ {0, 1}−s which satisfies pI [x] =
∑
w∈CI p|w[x] = 1.
Proof. If tI is neither a monomial nor a common subterm of some monomials in
the master polynomial p, then each monomial term in p must miss at least one
variable from tI (i.e an xi with i ∈ I). Therefore, in the summation of p over the
cube CI each monomial will be summed an even number of times, and hence will
be canceled out as the coeﬃcients are from GF(2); that is, pI ≡ 0 (and hence for
all x ∈ {0, 1}−s we have pI [x] = 0). To complete the proof, simply note that if
tI appears as a monomial or a common subterm of some monomials in p, then p
can be factored as p(x1, · · · , x) = tI · pS(I)+ q(x1, · · · , x), where pS(I) is either
the constant 1 (when tI is an independent monomial in p) or a polynomial over
at most −s variables (when tI is a common subterm of some monomials). From
Theorem 1 we know that pI = pS(I), and hence pI [x] = pS(I)[x] = 1 for at least
a vector x ∈ {0, 1}−s. unionsq
This lemma essentially provides the underlying idea for the following probabilis-
tic test, proposed originally in [2], to detect whether a given tI appears either
as a monomial or as a common subterm of some monomials within a master
polynomial p:
Step 1: select a value of vector x = (xs+1, · · · , x) ∈ {0, 1}−s.
Step 2: sum the polynomial p(x1, · · · , x) over the cube CI (i.e. over all values
of (x1, · · · , xs), where s = |I|), to get pI [x] (= pS(I)[x]).
Step 3: repeat the previous two steps N times and record the values of pI [x].
A random master polynomial p is expected to contain at least a monomial
x1 · · ·xs · · ·xj (j ≥ s) in which tI = (x1, · · · , xs) is either the monomial it-
self (for j = s) or a subterm of the monomial (for j > s), with high probability.
Hence, after a suﬃciently large number of repetitions N , one would ﬁnd at least
one nonzero superpoly pS(I) with high probability. However if tI is neither a
term nor a common subterm in p, the superpoly pS(I) will always evaluate to
zero.
We apply this test to estimate the the number of key variables within the
master polynomials representing each bit of the internal state; i.e. the master
polynomials representing Ajr[i] for 1 ≤ r ≤ 16, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3, and 0 ≤ i ≤ 31. To
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determine whether a key variable ki, 0 ≤ i ≤ 127, exists in a master polynomial
p, the following process is repeated for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ 127). Let tI = ki,
randomly choose “suﬃciently many” vectors x ∈ {0, 1}128+127 (i.e. the space
for 128 bits of the plaintext and the secret variables excluding ki), and sum the
polynomial p over tI for each sample vector x. If at least one sample vector x
results in pI = 1, then from Lemma 1, we can conclude that the key variable
ki exists within the master polynomial p. In our experiment, only after testing
about 300 random sample vectors, we have been able to successfully determine
that a high portion of the key variables exist in the master polynomials after
only two rounds, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. The number of key variables within the black box polynomials
A0r[i] A
1
r[i] A
2
r[i] A
3
r[i]
0 ≤ i ≤ 31 0 ≤ i ≤ 31 0 ≤ i ≤ 31 0 ≤ i ≤ 31
1st round (r = 1) 28 28 28 21
2nd round (r = 2) 127 127 127 123
3rd − 16th round (r ≥ 3) 128 128 128 128
We also need to estimate the degree d of each (black-box) master polynomial
in order to verify whether the cube attack can be eﬃciently implemented. For
this purpose, we construct the boolean functions representing output bits of the
NOEKEON’s S-boxes. Let xi and yi be, respectively, the input and output bits
of the S-box, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Each output bit yi can be represented as a boolean
function, as follows.
y0 = x0 + x1 + x2 + x0x1 + x0x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x0x2x3 + 1
y1 = x2 + x3 + x0x1 + x1x2 + x0x2x3 + x1x2x3 + 1
y2 = x0 + x1 + x1x2 + x2x3 + 1
y3 = x0 + x1x2
It is easy to see that the highest degree of the four boolean functions is 3,
which correspond to y0 and y1. Since the only nonlinear transformations in
NOEKEON are the S-boxes (used by the function Γ ), we can estimate the degree
d of the master polynomial for any round. If we consider a single bit leakage after
the third round, the degree of the master polynomials would be approximately
between 16 and (the maximum) 256, which is not suitable for our side channel
attack model, as it may be unlikely in practice to obtain a leakage that falls
within the internal state bits with low degree master polynomials. However if
we consider the degree after the second round, it turns out that the degrees of
the master polynomials are considerably low, i.e. between 4 and 27. Considering
that diﬀusion process is also almost complete after the second round (refer to
Table 2), it turns out that the second round is an appropriate round for the
single-bit-leakage side channel attack purpose.
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4.2 Finding Maxterm Equations
As an example of the single-bit-leakage attack, in this section we provide the
results of the analysis to ﬁnd maxterm equations from a master polynomial
associated with the ﬁrst bit of the internal state after the second round, i.e. A02[0].
(We note that this process can also be straightforwardly applied to any other
single bit position in the internal state after the second round, i.e. considering
the master polynomial of any Aj2[i] for 0 ≤ j ≤ 3, and 0 ≤ i ≤ 31).
Table 3. Cube indexes for maxterms and the linear superpoly for each maxterm
Cube Indexes Maxterm Equation Cube Indexes Maxterm Equation
{11,75,82} k39 {0,53,60,97} k113 + k89 + k57 + k49 + k33
{27,82,91} k55 {0,4,39,62} k98 + k34 + k26 + k10 + k2 + 1
{1,34,42,127} k100 {1,4,34,58} k119 + k111 + k95 + k71 + k55 + k47
{0,4,49,126} k102 {1,3,25,66} k118 + k110 + k94 + k70 + k54 + k46
{2,7,36,107} k105 {0,1,24,99} k116 + k108 + k92 + k68 + k52 + k44
{1,34,42,79} k108 {0,20,31,99} k112 + k96 + k80 + k64 + k48 + k32
{105,118,126} k107 + 1 {0,28,39,62} k114 + k106 + k50 + k42 + k26 + k2
{2,23,36,123} k121 {0,5,22,86} k113 + k97 + k81 + k65 + k49 + k33
{0,12,49,126} k110 {82,86,123} k114 + k106 + k90 + k66 + k50 + k42
{118,121,126} k123 {0,2,75,87} k115 + k107 + k91 + k67 + k51 + k43
{1,34,58,119} k124 {3,4,62,76} k116 + k61 + k60 + k52 + k36 + k28
{5,33,62,85} k126 + 1 {70,82,123} k120 + k96 + k80 + k72 + k56 + k32
{4,13,37,126} k33 {20,84,119} k122 + k114 + k74 + k66 + k58 + k50
{104,120,126} k36 {0,2,15,67} k122 + k106 + k58 + k42 + k26 + k10
{96,104,126} k44 {1,3,9,66} k123 + k107 + k91 + k75 + k59 + k43
{0,7,8,64} k60 {1,4,34,42} k126 + k118 + k78 + k70 + k62 + k54
{0,6,50,67} k63 {2,3,101,125} k116 + k60 + k52 + k45 + k37 + k12 + k4
{2,31,36,107} k97 {0,7,9,107} k120 + k104 + k96 + k56 + k40 + k32 + k0 + 1
{0,3,101,125} k98 + 1 {1,4,13,126} k118 + k110 + k102 + k78 + k54 + k46 + k38 + 1
{46,121,126} k99 + 1 {1,5,92,99} k125 + k109 + k101 + k69 + k61 + k45 + k37
{0,8,47,74} k103 + k38 {1,2,44,107} k127 + k119 + k111 + k63 + k56 + k55 + k47 + k23 + 1
{2,89,96,101} k118 + k53 {1,2,60,89} k119 + k111 + k55 + k47 + k40 + k32 + k31 + k7 + 1
{0,7,8,90} k119 + k54 {1,36,99,126,127} k111 + k103 + k56 + k47 + k39 + k32 + k31 + k23
{0,8,47,66} k127 + k62 {3,38,114,124,127} k57 + k41 + k33 + k1
{30,82,123} k98 + k90 + k74 + k66 + k34 {27,54,122,124,127} k121 + k33 + k25 + k9 + k1 + 1
{0,10,19,95} k99 + k91 + k75 + k67 + k35 {105,108,120,124,126,127} k92 + k61 + k28 + 1
{0,1,64,99} k100 + k92 + k76 + k68 + k36 {57,120,121,124,126,127} k113 + k57 + k49 + k33 + k25 + 1
{4,6,11,34} k103 + k95 + k79 + k71 + k39 + 1 {102,113,122,124,126,127} k121 + k65 + k57 + k41 + k33 + 1
{6,62,68,74} k104 + k80 + k72 + k64 + k40 {94,121,122,124,126,127} k108 + k60 + k44 + k37 + k36 + k4
{0,5,6,70} k105 + k81 + k73 + k65 + k41 {78,113,114,124,126,127} k127 + k119 + k79 + k71 + k63 + k55
By running the preprocessing phase of the attack (on a single PC) for several
weeks, we have been able to ﬁnd collectively thousands of maxterm equations
using diﬀerent cubes sizes, where most of them were found to be redundant and
linearly dependent equations. To ﬁlter the equations and obtain only linearly
independent equations among them, we used the well-known Gaussian elimina-
tion. The elimination gives us only 60 linearly independent equations over 99
key variables. Table 3 shows the indexes of variables in the maxterms and the
corresponding linearly independent equations that we have obtained. (The in-
dexes for both the plaintext and the key variables start from index 0, namely
the MSB, until 127).
As shown in the table, the maxterms start to appear within tI ’s of size 3;
we have 2 maxterms of size 3, 50 maxterms of size 4, 3 maxterms of size 5,
and 5 maxterms of size 6. Hence, the total number of the chosen plaintexts for
the online phase of the cube attack is 2 × 23 + 50 × 24 + 3 × 25 + 5 × 26 ≈
210.27. Considering that we have 60 linearly independent equations over the key
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variables, the total time complexity to ﬁnd the correct 128-bit key reduces to
O(268) (compared to the O(2128) for an exhaustive key search attack).
5 Conclusions
We investigated the security of the direct-key mode of the NOEKEON block ci-
pher against cube attacks in the (single-bit-leakage) side channel attack model.
Our analysis shows that one can recover the 128-bit key of the cipher, by con-
sidering a one-bit information leakage from the internal state after the second
round, with time complexity of O(268) evaluations of the cipher, and data com-
plexity of about 210 chosen plaintexts. At this step, we have been able to ﬁnd 60
linearly independent equations over 99 key variables, but from an initial obser-
vation, it seems that some nonlinear equations of low degree especially of degree
2 can also be easily found, which may further reduce the complexity of the at-
tack. We leave extending the attack and exploiting such quadratic equations for
a future research.
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